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the *Metaphysics*, no student of Aristotle can fail to derive a great deal of instruction and stimulus from his close grappling with the many problems presented by the text as it stands. Especially interesting is the second part, entitled "Die literarische Stellung und Form der Metaphysik," which is elaborated, evidently under the influence of von Wilamowitz, into something like a systematic history of the delivery and publication of professional lectures in antiquity.

PAUL SHOREY

Sophistik und Rhetorik. Das Bildungsideal des εὐ λέγειν in seinem Verhältnis zur Philosophie des V. Jahrhunderts. Von H. GOMPERZ. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912. Pp. vi+292. M. 10.

The writer, who must be distinguished from his father, the author of *Greek Thinkers*, has chosen for his special domain the border-land of philosophy, rhetoric, and sophistic in the fifth and fourth centuries. The main thesis of the present volume is that sophistic was in its essence rhetoric—the theory and practice of the art εὐ λέγειν—and that all philosophic, scientific, or other special interests which modern historians of philosophy attribute by tradition to the fifth-century Sophists are to be taken in strict subordination to this dominant end. In confirmation of this presumption, he undertakes a broad and somewhat prolix survey of the extant tradition as conveniently collected in Diels. Gorgias' treatise on *Nature or the Non-existent* is not a serious exposition of critical skepticism, but the maintenance of a paradoxical thesis in the style and the logical divisions of his *Praise of Helen* and his *Defence of Palamedes*, the genuineness of which Gomperz defends at length. Thrasymachus did not teach the ethical nihilism attributed to him by Plato. The famous fragment to the effect that the gods do not concern themselves with human affairs since men obviously make no use of justice must have been a mere jest of one of the ὑπερβάλλοντες or exaggerating discourses. The Thrasymachus of the first book of the *Republic* is merely a dramatic representative of an unknown contemporary attacked by Plato—the author of the *Clitophon* which Gomperz thinks was written about 390. This unknown writer, after there exposing the negative and unsatisfactory character of all Socratic definitions of justice, probably went on in a lost supplement to the *Clitophon* to develop as his own definition the formula which Plato attributes to Thrasymachus—that justice is the advantage of the stronger.

Antiphon the Sophist is to be distinguished from the orator. Though a student of Empedocles, he is not properly speaking a philosopher; he is the rhetorician of the elevated commonplace, as Gorgias is the rhetorician of the paradox. The predominance of the merely formal over the substantive interest in Hippias, the Anonymus of Iamblichus, and the *Dialexeis* is easily demonstrated. Prodicus' advanced course in synonyms was not a scientific

study of semasiology, but a practical guide to the use of the effective word in oratory and debate. His *Choice of Heracles* was doubtless an edifying discourse for young men to hear, and to that extent he, like other Sophists, "taught virtue." But this is not enough to constitute him either an ethical philosopher or a moral idealist of the Socratic or Platonic type.

Some twelve pages of Diels suffice for the collection of all that antiquity has told us about Protagoras. Gomperz' comment fills some hundred and fifty pages of his book. He is not the first and will not be the last to write at inordinate length about Protagoras, and I mention the fact, not by way of censure, but as one more illustration of the paradox that philologists tend to enlarge their treatment of a subject in the inverse ratio to available evidence—*τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθέναι*. We have no means of reconciling the seeming contradiction between the dialectic helplessness of the Protagoras of the dialogue which bears his name and the subtle psychology of the apology attributed to him in the *Theaetetus*. The probabilities can be stated in a paragraph. The systematic exposition of a coherent doctrine of relativity and positivism, or pragmatism as the fashion of the day calls it, is probably a Platonic development of suggestions latent in isolated Protagorean paradoxes and epigrams. On this point Gomperz seems to agree with me against his father, as he does in maintaining that Protagoras would have hardly distinguished between the generic and the individual interpretation of *homo mensura*, though if option is forced, we must decide for the individual interpretation. But though he believes that the systematic form of the exposition is Platonic, he thinks it possible to prove that the main doctrinal content is Protagorean. In the details of this demonstration I cannot follow him. His conclusion is that Protagoras is the only Sophist who is at the same time an original philosophic thinker. Yet the philosophy even of Protagoras is merely an introduction to, or a by-product of, his rhetoric. The principle of relativity and the universal anthesis of the two *logoi* are symbols and reflections of the opposing theses and arguments in rhetorical debate.

Into this rhetorical world of beautiful plausibility Socrates enters with the questions: How is the thing really? What is the truth of the matter? The development of these questions by Plato and Aristotle opposed a new ideal of scientific education and culture to the purely formal ideal of the Sophists. Yet (p. 290) "so wäre Platon nicht Platon geworden, hätte er nicht die erfinderische Vielseitigkeit des Gedankens und die künstlerische Vollendung der Sprache von den Sophisten übernommen und sie in den Dienst der socratischen Postulate gestellt."

The style is readable and the book is full of interesting suggestions. It is, however, by no means free from the false point-making, straining of evidence, forced parallels and perverse ingenuity which are the bane of present-day philology. As I have harped perhaps too often upon this string, I will here confine myself to one example. On page 164 the author argues that

the verbal coincidence of the *Dialexeis* and the pseudo-Platonic *περὶ δικαίου* in the expressions *ἐν τῷ δέοντι* and *καιρῷ* prove beyond a doubt that both used a common fifth-century source, and further justifies the conclusion that the *περὶ δικαίου* belongs to about the first decade after Socrates' death, and that its doctrine of *καιρός* is derived not from Gorgias but from Protagoras. Now as a matter of fact (1) almost any Greek writer could use those innocent expressions and *καιρός* is one of the earliest of Greek commonplaces; (2) they are not found together in the *Dialexeis*, but *καιρῷ* occurs in number 2, and *ἐν δέοντι* in number 4; (3) the *περὶ δικαίου* is steeped in Platonic reminiscences, and if its author required a source for *ἐν (τῷ) δέοντι* he could have found it in *Rep.* 414B, as he could have found his similar application of *ἐπ’ ὀφελείᾳ* in *Rep.* 389B and 334B, and as he could have found in *Symp.* 181A the entire thought (though not the words) of the argument that no act is good or bad in itself, but only through the manner of its performance.

PAUL SHOREY

Luciani quae feruntur Podagra et Ocypus. Praefatus edidit commen-tatus est JOHANNES ZIMMERMANN. Lipsiae: in aedibus B. G. Teubneri, MCMIX. Pp. 82.

These two short pieces in verse have led a shifting existence, now accepted by some editors as legitimate Lucianic offspring, now rejected by others as supposititious twins, while by a smaller number of commentators their claims have been differentiated and the *Tragopodagra* alone admitted to the list of the author's genuine writings. Few, even of seasoned Lucian students, have cared to give them much more than cursory attention. Most readers are well content to reject them as spurious or to accept them apologetically as indicative of the advanced senility of the ex-rhetorician, dropping into verse as he shuffled into his grave.

M. Croiset, however, after admitting (*La vie et les œuvres de Lucien*, p. 84) that these two dialogues alone would never have won immortality for the writer, adds: "Mais il y a de l'esprit, du trait, et ce genre d'enjouement ironique et moqueur qui lui était propre. Nous n'avons donc pas de raison suffisante pour les déclarer apocryphes." A verdict based upon such grounds from a writer usually so keen to detect the true Lucianic hall-marks would have greater weight were it not that an attentive reading of the two pieces brings out so clearly the jejune banality of the *Ocypus*, both in matter and manner, that it would seem probable that M. Croiset has transferred the merits, belonging to the *Tragopodagra* alone, to his estimate of both on the ground that they must stand or fall together.

It is just here that Zimmermann's monograph forms a real contribution. He dissociates the two, claiming that the *Tragopodagra* is genuine and the *Ocypus* spurious, and proceeds to examine them with somewhat meticulous Teutonic detail and occasional over-emphasis of nonessentials.